A slightly different version of this post appears at Common Dreams.
A new analysis of charter schools in the U. S. is out from CREDO, the Stanford-based outfit that found in 2009, when there were 4,700 charters across 40 states, that 17 percent of the nation’s charter schools were scoring better on standardized tests than the public schools they were created to replace:
A new analysis of charter schools in the U. S. is out from CREDO, the Stanford-based outfit that found in 2009, when there were 4,700 charters across 40 states, that 17 percent of the nation’s charter schools were scoring better on standardized tests than the public schools they were created to replace:
While the report recognized a robust national demand for more charter
schools from parents and local communities, it found that 17 percent of charter
schools reported academic gains that were significantly better than traditional
public schools, while 37 percent of charter schools showed gains that were
worse than their traditional public school counterparts, with 46 percent of
charter schools demonstrating no significant difference.
Thanks to billions poured into the segregated charter effort
over the years from the federal treasury and from corporate foundations ($312 million from the Walton Foundation, alone), those peer-reviewed findings in
2009 were summarily ignored, so that now in 2013, there are 6,000+ charters in
42 states. This may be referred to as
the Fill-the-Hole-with-Money Strategy.
This new 2013 research from CREDO differs from
the 2009 research piece by focusing primarily on charters that are part of
charter management organizations (CMOs), which are corporate chains such as
KIPP, Inc. or White Hat Management, Inc. This most recent study examined
performance among 1,372 schools that belong to 167 CMOs. So independent
charters were not a part of the most recent study.
There are a number of interesting takeaways from
this CMO study, but the one that stands out is stated thusly in the Press
Release:
In the aggregate, CMOs perform about
the same as traditional public schools (TPS), but the aggregate masks the more
interesting and important story of the distribution of performance around the
average.
So with the exceptions of segregated chains like KIPP and
Uncommon Schools, which can attribute their high scores to 1) creaming of top
performers, 2) shoving out of low performers and discipline problems, 3) huge
$$ advantages, 4) 10 hour school days, 5) laser focused test prep, etc., the rest of
the CMOs can only say they are no better than the struggling public schools
they were designed to replace. From the Executive Summary (all bolds in
original):
Across the 25 states in the study, a sample of 167 operating CMOs were
identified for the years 2007 - 2011. CMOs on average are not dramatically
better than non-CMO schools in terms of their contributions to student
learning. The difference in learning compared to the Traditional Public school
alternatives for CMOs is -.005 standard deviations in Math and .005 in reading;
both these values are statistically significant, but obviously not materially
different from the comparison (p. 6)
But let’s look a little closer.
The real story of CMOs is found in their range of quality. The
measures of aggregate performance, however, mask considerable variation across
CMOs in terms of their overall quality and impact. Across the 167 CMOs, 43
percent outpace the learning gains of their local TPS in reading; 37 percent of
CMOs do so in math. These proportions are more positive than was seen for
charter schools as a whole, where 17 percent posted better results. However, about
a third (37%) of CMOs have portfolio average learning gains that are
significantly worse in reading, and half lag their TPS counterparts in math
(pp. 5-6).
Translation: Over a third of segregated CMOs are doing worse
in reading, and 43% are doing better; over a third of CMOs are doing better in
math, but 50 percent are doing worse in math.
If these numbers reflected the results of trials for a new drug, would these trials lead to approval by the FDA? Is this the best we
can expect from charters after billions poured into this new hole in the ground
that is being mined by ideologues, tax-evaders, corporate welfare schemers, profiteers,
sold-out politicians, and hedge fund operators?
In fact, it is the best we may expect, for if
there is another big takeaway that should cause Duncan and Gates to look the
other way quickly, it is this, from the Press Release, that concludes that,
like bad wine, low scoring segregated charters don’t get better with time:
“This report’s findings challenge the conventional wisdom
that a young underperforming school will improve if given time. Our research
shows that if you start wobbly, chances are you’ll stay wobbly,” said Dr.
Margaret Raymond, CREDO’s director and the study’s lead author. “Similarly, if
a school is successful in producing strong academic progress from the start,
our analysis shows it will remain a strong and successful school.”
“We have solid evidence that high quality is possible from
the outset,” Dr. Raymond said. “Since the study also shows that the majority of
charter management organizations produce consistent quality through their
portfolios – regardless of the actual level of quality – policy makers will
want to assure that charter schools that replicate have proven models of
success.”
What the study found, however, is that the
unproven segregated models are replicating faster than the high flyers like KIPP:
. . .the lowest third of CMOs replicate more rapidly than middling or
high-performing CMOs. Of the 245 new schools that were started by CMOs over the
course of this study, 121 (or 49 percent) were begun by Organizations whose average
performance was in the bottom third of the range. Another 19 percent (47
schools) were started by CMOs in the middle third of the quality distribution.
The final 77 new schools (31 percent) were opened by CMOs in the top third of
the distribution. This finding highlights the need to be vigilant about which
CMOs replicate; CMOs with high average learning gains remain high performers as
they grow and CMOs with poor results remain inferior.
The new Report concludes, too, that the RTTT
policy of planning miracle turnarounds among the lowest performing schools to
be another fanciful bit of public relations from ED. Wonder how Kevin Huffman will respond to this. After all, he has set TN with the task of
making the state’s worst schools the best in five years!
The lessons of this study also include the notion of authorizer
triage. Most authorizers have limited resources, so
deploying them where they have the highest impact is desirable. The temptation
to focus on the lowest performing schools is not supported by this analysis,
but attention to the schools in quintile two (or quintiles 1 and 2 for
elementary schools) holds out more promising effects (p. 8).